Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games by Dinis, Luis & Parrondo, Juan M. R.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
21
23
58
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  2
 O
ct 
20
14 Europhysics Letters PREPRINT
Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games
Luis Dinis and Juan M.R. Parrondo
Grupo Intedisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC) and Dept. de F´ısica Ato´mica,
Molecular y Nuclear, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 28040-Madrid, Spain.
PACS. 02.50.-r – Probability theory, stochastic processes, and statistics .
PACS. 02.50.Ey – Stochastic processes .
PACS. 05.40.-a – Fluctuation phenomena, random processes, noise, and Brownian motion.
Abstract. – We present a modification of the so-called Parrondo’s paradox where one is
allowed to choose in each turn the game that a large number of individuals play. It turns out
that, by choosing the game which gives the highest average earnings at each step, one ends
up with systematic loses, whereas a periodic or random sequence of choices yields a steadily
increase of the capital. An explanation of this behavior is given by noting that the short-range
maximization of the returns is “killing the goose that laid the golden eggs”. A continuous
model displaying similar features is analyzed using dynamic programming techniques from
control theory.
The physics of Brownian motors has recently inspired the discovery of a counterintuitive
phenomenon in gambling games, which is attracting considerable attention. Ajdari and Prost
showed that a one dimensional Brownian particle in a flashing asymmetric potential experi-
ments a net motion in a given direction [1]. The motion persists even against a small force.
Consequently, one can have the following startling situation: the particle moves in the direc-
tion of the force if the potential is on or if it is off, whereas it moves in the opposite direction
if the potential is flashing. The translation of the dynamics of this Brownian particle to gam-
bling games constitutes the so-called Parrondo’s paradox [2, 3]: two losing games yield, when
alternated, a winning game. The effect is obtained with two games, A and B, that mimic the
behavior of the Brownian particle in a flat and a ratchet potential, respectively.
In game A, the capitalX(t) of the player increases by one unit with probability p1 = 1/2−ǫ,
where ǫ is a small positive real number, and decreases by one unit with probability 1− p1. In
the following, we will interpret the game as a bet on the toss of a slightly biased coin.
Game B is played with two coins depending on X(t): if X(t) is not a multiple of three, we
use coin 2, with a probability to win p2 = 3/4− ǫ and a probability to lose 1− p2; if X(t) is a
multiple of three, we use coin 3, with a probability to win p3 = 1/10− ǫ and a probability to
lose 1− p3. It can be proved that the combination of the “good” coin 2 and the “bad” coin 3
yields a fair game when ǫ = 0, and a losing game when ǫ > 0 [3]. By fair, losing and winning
here we mean that the average capital 〈X(t)〉 is a constant, decreasing or increasing function
of t, respectively.
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We then have two games, A and B, which are fair (losing) if ǫ = 0 (ǫ > 0). The afore-
mentioned counterintuitive effect is that the alternation of A and B, in some given random or
periodic sequences, is a winning game.
The phenomenon indicates that the alternation of stochastic dynamics can result in a
behavior which differs qualitatively from that exhibited by each of the dynamics, and therefore,
could in principle be relevant in a variety of situations, ranging from economics to physics,
where the constrains or the dynamics of a system switches between two arrangements [3].
However, the paradox loses all its interest if one is allowed to choose the game to play in
each turn. In this case, the trivial strategy is to choose A when X(t) is a multiple of three and
B otherwise. The resulting game is clearly winning and this strategy performs better than
any periodic or random alternation of games A and B. We could call these latter strategies
“blind”, since they do not use any information about the state of the system.
In a similar way, if one has some information about the position of the particle in a flashing
ratchet, it is possible to switch on and off the potential in such a way that energy is extracted
from a single thermal bath. This is nothing but a Maxwell demon [4].
For a Brownian particle, it is known that the acquisition of this information, or its subse-
quent erasure from a memory device, has some unavoidable entropy cost [5], which prevents
any violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. On the other hand, in other contexts,
like economics, there is no such limitations and it is unlikely that blind strategies could be of
any interest.
However, the model that we present in this Letter shows that this is not the case. It is a
modification of the original Parrondo’s paradox in which blind strategies are winning whereas
a strategy which chooses the game with the highest average return is losing. Moreover, we
will identify the mechanism underlying this counterintuitive behavior and show with a second
model that it can also appear in simple deterministic systems.
The two models presented are also of interest in control theory. The choice of a strategy
maximizing some quantity is a problem widely treated by optimal control theory, which has
been proven a powerful tool in a number of disciplines including engineering, physics, chem-
istry, economics, social sciences, medicine and biology [6,7]. The counterintuitive phenomenon
discussed in this Letter, up to our knowledge, has not been reported before and can be relevant
in optimization problems involving dynamical systems.
The first model consists of a large number N of players. At each turn of the game, a
fraction γ of these players is randomly selected. We are told how much money every player
has and we are then allowed to choose a game, A or B, which will be played by all γN players
in the subset. Our goal is to choose each turn between A or B in order to maximize the
average earnings of the players. We consider three different strategies:
• Periodic strategy: the game is selected by following a given periodic sequence, for ex-
ample ABBABB. . .
• Random strategy: the game is chosen randomly with equal probability for both A and
B.
• Short-range (SR) optimal strategy: the game that will yield the highest average return
is chosen.
As we will see below, the third strategy makes use of the available information whereas
the periodic and random strategies are blind, in the sense defined above. Surprisingly, these
blind strategies produce a systematic winning whereas the SR optimal strategy is losing, as it
is shown in figure 1.
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Fig. 1 – Evolution of the average money of an infinity number of players for γ = 0.675 and ǫ = 0.005
and the three strategies discussed in the text.
A detailed analysis of our model will reveal the underlying mechanism causing this un-
expected phenomenon. The key magnitude for this analysis is π0(t), the fraction of players
whose money is a multiple of three in turn t. From π0(t), it is not difficult to calculate the
average fraction of players that would win in each game:
pwinA = p1
pwinB = π0p3 + (1− π0)p2 (1)
The SR optimal strategy chooses the game which gives the highest return in one turn. Com-
paring pwinA and pwinB we get the following prescription:
play A if π0(t) ≥ π0c
play B if π0(t) < π0c (2)
with π0c ≡ (p1 − p2)/(p3 − p2) = 5/13.
Let us focus now on the behavior of π0(t) for ǫ = 0. On one hand, π0(t) tends to 1/3 if A is
played a large number of turns, because, under the rules of A, the capital X(t) is a symmetric
and homogenous random walk. On the other hand, if B is played repeatedly, π0(t) tends to
5/13, i.e., to π0c. This can be proved by analyzing game B as a Markov chain [3]. Notice also
that this coincidence was expected since B is fair game for ǫ = 0 and π0c has been obtained
by solving pwinB = pwinA = 1/2.
Figure 2 represents schematically the evolution of π0(t) under the action of each game,
as well as the prescription of the SR optimal strategy given by Eq. (2). Now we are ready
to explain why the SR optimal strategy yields worse results than the periodic and random
sequences.
Consider an initial distribution of the capital such that π0(0) < π0c = 5/13. The SR
optimal strategy chooses B and, consequently, π0 increases. If π0(1) is still under 5/13 (and
this is the case for γ small enough), the SR optimal strategy chooses B again. We see that, as
far as π0(t) does not exceed 5/13, the SR optimal strategy chooses B in every turn. However,
this choice, although it is the one which gives the highest returns in each turn, drives π0(t)
towards 5/13, i.e., towards values of π0(t) where the gain is small. For instance, if γ = 1/2,
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Fig. 2 – Schematic representation of the evolution of π0(t) under the action of game A and game B.
The prescription of the SR optimal strategy is also represented.
the SR optimal strategy chooses B forty times in a row before switching to game A. This will
make π0 approximately equal to π0c = 5/13 at almost every turn, as can be seen in figure 3
(left). The same figure (right) shows that, as long as π0(t) is close to π0c, the average capital
remains approximately constant.
On the other hand, the random and the periodic strategies choose game A even when
π0 < π0c. This will not produce earnings in this specific turn, but will take π0 away from π0c
and make the corresponding average money grow faster than that for the SR optimal strategy,
as can be seen in the figure.
In other words, the SR optimal strategy, by choosing B too many times, is “killing the
goose that laid the golden eggs”, and to perform better than this strategy one must sacrifice
short-term profits for higher returns in the future, as the blind strategies considered here do.
The introduction of ǫ has two consequences: it turns A and B into losing games when
played alone, and it decreases the stationary value for game B, which now is below π0c = 5/13
(the critical value π0c does not change). Due to the latter, the system may get trapped playing
game B forever when following the SR optimal strategy and, since B is now a losing game, the
average money will decrease. This is, for instance, the situation already presented in figure 1
for ǫ = 0.005 and γ = 0.675.
Now we present a continuous and deterministic model which displays some of the features
of the previous one. Consider the following dynamical system:
y˙(t) = α(t)x(t)
x˙(t) = −
1
τ
[x(t)− xfc(1− α(t))] (3)
with α(t) = 0 or 1. Our task is to find α(t) that maximizes y(T ). These equations are a
rather generic model of a system which produces some output like, for instance, a production
plant. y(t) is the total cumulative output of the plant up to time t. We can decide to switch
on and off the plant at every time t by setting α(t) = 1 or α(t) = 0, respectively. Finally, x(t)
is the productivity of the plant, which decreases exponentially when the plant is working and
goes back to its full capacity value xfc when the plant is off, τ being the characteristic time
of these relaxations. If we are allowed to use the plant up to a time T , the problem is to find
the protocol or policy α(t) maximizing the total output y(T ).
A naive approach to the problem consists of maximizing y˙(t) at every time t:
α(t) =
{
0 if x(t) < 0
1 if x(t) ≥ 0
(4)
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Fig. 3 – Evolution of π0 (left) and the average capital (right) for N = ∞, γ = 0.5, ǫ = 0 and the
three different strategies. The arrows in the left figure show the turns where the short-range optimal
strategy chooses game A and they coincide with the steps of the curve representing the capital.
However, it is not hard to see that this set up will keep y(t) = y(0) for all t if initially the
productivity x(0) is negative, or make y(t) tend to y(0) + τx(0) exponentially if x(0) > 0.
In either case, y(t) will attain a saturation value. The criterion (4) prescribes making the
plant work whenever the productivity is positive, and this is equivalent to the short-range
optimal strategy in our previous model, which dictated to play game B if π0(t) < π0c. If the
productivity is positive, we of course get more when the plant is working, but then we also get
a decrease of the productivity which will end up exhausting the system. With the prescription
given by (4) we are also killing the goose that laid the golden eggs, and it is again possible to
do better by letting the plant rest even when the productivity x(t) is positive.
Surprisingly enough and despite the linearity and simplicity of our system, the precise
optimal policy α(t) is not easy to find. Some of the techniques provided by control theory fail
in this case, such as the Euler-Lagrange equations and the Pontryagin principle [6]. The only
way to completely solve the problem is to optimize a discrete version such as:
xk+1 = xk − h(xk − 1 + αk)
yk+1 = yk + hαkxk (5)
where h is a small time step, and we have taken xfc = τ = 1 for simplicity. The optimization
of this discrete system can be done applying the so-called Bellman’s Optimality Criterion [6],
which states that in the optimal policy, the final decisions αk (k = n, . . . , N) are optimal given
the state resulting from the first decisions, αk (k = 0, . . . , n − 1). That is, we can find the
αN−n maximizing Jn ≡ yN+1− yN−n as a function of xN−n, yN−n, recursively from n = 0 to
n = N [8].
The optimal choice of α(t) in terms of the state x(t) happens to be:
α(t) =
{
0 if x(t) < xc(t)
1 if x(t) ≥ xc(t)
(6)
where xc(t) is a critical value for the productivity which can be calculated by solving the
resulting recurrence equations. In figure 4 we show xc(t) for τ = xfc = 1, h = 0.1, and T = 2,
6 EUROPHYSICS LETTERS
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
t
x(t)
xc(t)
y(t)
Fig. 4 – The cumulative output y(t), the productivity x(t), and the critical value xc(t) for the discrete
version of the system (3), T = 2, h = 0.1, and τ = xfc = 1.
as well as the behaviour of y(t) and x(t) (we have chosen a relatively big time step to make
clear the rapid changes in α(t) and x(t) ). We see that this optimal policy achieves a steadily
increase of the output y(t). Fig. 5 shows a numerical computation of xc(t) now for a shorter
time step h = 0.001, and different values of the total time, T = 2, 3, and 4. Here we can see
again that xc(t) = 0.5 until the final part of the interval [0, T ].
Consequently, the behaviour of the optimal policy α(t) is as follows. There is a first stage in
which the productivity x(t) goes to 0.5 by setting α = 0 if x(0) < 0.5 and α = 1 if x(0) ≥ 0.5.
Once x(t) reaches the value 0.5, the optimal policy prescribes very rapid changes between
α = 0 and α = 1 which keep x(t) ≃ 0.5. Finally, in the last part of the interval [0, T ], when
xc(t) starts to decrease, the optimal policy chooses α(t) = 1.
The first two stages can be easily explained, even for arbitrary values of τ and xfc. For this
purpose, let us assume for a moment that α(t) is constant but can take any value within the
interval [0, 1]. Then x(t) reaches a stationary value xst = xfc(1− α). This gives the following
stationary slope for the cumulative output y(t):
y˙(t) = αxst = xfc [α(1 − α)] (7)
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Fig. 5 – Numerical computation of xc(t), for h = 0.001, T = 2, 3 and 4, and τ = xfc = 1.
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which is maximum for α = 0.5 and xst = xfc/2. Therefore, the optimal policy should try to
drive x(t) to xfc/2 and keep it there, i.e., should try to make the plant work at half of its full
capacity. In our case, α(t) can only take values 0 and 1. However, by rapid oscillations one
can get an effective value of α(t) equal to any real number between 0 and 1. The optimal
policy implies a rapid variation which gives an effective value α = 0.5, yielding a slope for y(t)
which is y˙(t) = xfc/4, definitely better than the short-range optimization of y˙(t) which gave
us a horizontal slope.
The final stage of the optimal policy α(t) has a clear intuitive explanation. We have to
abandon the plant at time T . Therefore, the optimal policy when t is approaching T should
set α(t) = 1, since we want to get as much as possible and do not care if we leave the plant
exhausted after T . This is exactly what happens to a middle-distance runner: she keeps a
constant velocity which allows her to maintain a stationary regime but she sprints in the last
meters of the race to use up all her strength. With this picture in mind, we call this last stage
the “sprint”. One can calculate the duration of the sprint, tsprint, in our model, assuming that
x(0) = xfc/2, α(t) = 1/2 for t < T − tsprint and α(t) = 1 for t > T − tsprint. Eq. (3) can then
be fully solved yielding:
y(T ) =
xfc
4
(T − tsprint) +
τxfc
2
(
1− e−tsprint/τ
)
(8)
¿From this expression one easily finds that y(T ) reaches its maximum for tsprint = τ ln 2 ≃
0.693 τ , in agreement with the curves in Fig. 5.
In conclusion, we have presented a stochastic model in which a short-range optimization
yields to systematic loses, whereas blind strategies steadily win. We have found an explanation
of this phenomenon based on the fact that the short-range optimal strategy is “killing the goose
that laid the golden egg”, and proven that the same mechanism can also arise in a linear
deterministic system. In fact, similar mechanisms has been widely reported in the realm
of economics and ecology, although mainly described qualitatively. The risks of overtaxing
commerce and the overuse of natural resources are representative cases. We believe that the
models presented here could inspire new quantitative approaches to these problems.
∗ ∗ ∗
We are grateful to C. Van den Broeck for fruitful discussions. This work has been financially
supported by grant BFM2001-0291-C02-02 from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa (Spain)
and by a grant from Del Amo Program (Universidad Complutense).
REFERENCES
[1] Ajdari A. and Prost J., C.R. Acad. Sci. Paris II, 315, 1635 (1993).
[2] Harmer, G. P. and Abbott, D., Nature, 402, 846 (1999).
[3] Harmer, G. P. and Abbott, D., Fluct. and Noise Lett. 2, R71 (2002).
[4] Parrondo, J. M. R. and Cisneros, B.J., Appl. Phys. A 75, 179 (2002).
[5] Leff, H. S. and Rex, A. F., Maxwell’s Demon. Entropy, Information, Computing (Adam Hilger,
1990).
[6] Layton, J.M., Multivariable control theory (Peter Peregrinus, 1976).
[7] Lewis, F.L. and Syrmos, V.L., Optimal control (Wiley, 1995).
[8] Dinis, L. and Parrondo, J.M.R., in preparation.
